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Abstract
Empirical studies of the “old EU” countries suggest that poverty brings limited social
relations and a lack of social support in its wake. At the same time, it is thought that in the
transition countries, especially, individual supply crises are compensated for by a
composite and stable network of social relations as well as a tradition of solidarity as a
dominant value. This paper looks at the ways in which cultures of support vary across the
enlarged Europe and to this end examines the link between poverty and social disintegration
in countries characterised by different economic, cultural and welfare state regimes. The
empirical analysis is concerned with (1) the distribution of social integration across the
enlarged Europe, and (2) the verification of the hypothesis of accumulation and compensation
in the individual countries. An additional step seeks to identify (3) the reasons for the
variation across countries in the relationship between poverty and social disintegration.
This macro-sociological perspective examines context effects that allow conclusions to
be drawn regarding two hypotheses, in particular – that of stigmatisation and that of
crowding out. Is poverty, which only affects a minority of the population in countries with
a generally high standard of living, closely associated with stigmatisation, and does it lead
to social withdrawal? Does a precarious system of social protection increase private
solidarity and is support potential reduced in an environment of universal risk insurance?
Within this same context, the paper also looks for evidence of (4) greater recourse to family
support in precarious life situations. The data on which the study is based is taken from
the European Quality of Life Survey – a representative survey of living conditions and
quality of life in Europe that was carried out in October 2003.
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Introduction
People with low incomes and a low standard of living depend on assistance and have a
particular need for social support. The perception of the role and of the relationship
between the state and private networks as regards the provision of support varies from
country to country. The object of this paper is to determine whether poor people are just
as well integrated in social networks as well-off people, whether they can perhaps count
on receiving more support than the latter or whether being materially disadvantaged
increases the likelihood of social disintegration. It is assumed in the study that the degree
to which poor people are socially integrated varies across Europe in accordance with the
characteristics of each individual country. What will be examined here is to what extent
the social integration of the poor is influenced by the general standard of living in a country,
by strategies to combat poverty and norms of equity and solidarity that are specific to
different welfare state regimes.
The question as to whether and how economic and social disadvantages interact in
different countries is substantial both from a sociological and a socio-political perspective.
There is still a tendency in inequality research to focus primarily on the material dimension
of social disadvantage and to neglect the role of social relations, even though embeddedness
in social networks is widely recognised as an indicator of integration. One merit of the
current debate – as popular as it is heated – on the risks of social exclusion is that it has
drawn attention to the multi-dimensionality and relationality of social disadvantage
(European Commission 2004, Atkinson/Davoudi 2000, Room 1995, Silver 1994). The
accompanying diversification of poverty research has brought questions regarding the
relationship between monetary and non-monetary disadvantage, and as to whether social
support is particularly jeopardised by a low standard of living or whether, on the contrary,
such conditions render it particularly robust.
The social policy agenda of the EU also strongly emphasises the need for a poverty
policy that is not based exclusively on monetary resources and encourages the widespread
promotion of social integration. Family support and social integration via employment are
particularly important in this respect. In a context of welfare state reform in the form of
privatisation and benefit cuts, social networks are an extremely important resource for
individuals who are coping with precarious situations, and they may become increasingly
important in the future as a means of compensation. These developments suggest that the
relationship between material and immaterial inequality is worth exploring. The possible
effects of regime-specific norms of equity, solidarity and supply on the dynamics of this
relationship is an area of research that has been rather neglected.
Country-specific variations in the relationship between poverty and social disintegration
have not yet been examined for the enlarged EU. A pattern of accumulation appears to be
prevalent in the old member states, although its strength vary. Transition studies of the
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post-communist countries, by contrast, often argue that these populations compensate for
supply crises by means of a comprehensive and stable network of social relations and the
extensive practice of solidarity. We know, for example, from Eurobarometer surveys that
family support for the poor is widespread in the new member states. A total of 28.6 % of
the people in these countries responded in 2001 that it was first and foremost their families
who provided support when they lacked basic supplies. This share amounted to only 17 %
in the EU-15 countries. So is there a different pattern of interaction between material
poverty and social integration in the new member states, where the standard of living is
significantly lower than in the old EU countries? And do cultures of support vary according
to the type of regime in place?
This paper focuses on investigating the hypothesis of accumulation and compensation.
It also asks under which conditions material and social disadvantages accumulate to a
greater or lesser degree. Thus, particular consideration is given to the context in which
people are poor. To what extent does it depend on the type of welfare state regime, on
country-specific strategies to combat poverty and on other national parameters whether
poor people receive substantial or little support from their families and friends? Do poor
people in prosperous countries withdraw more rapidly into social disintegration because
they are stigmatised as a minority and because poverty is interpreted as a personal failure?
Is this stigmatisation effect absent, on the other hand, in countries where poverty is
widespread because precarious circumstances have become a common experience of life
and are considered a consequence of economic crises and government error? The aim of
the comparative analysis of data from the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) carried
out in 2003 in all member states of the enlarged EU is to reveal patterns of interaction
between material poverty and social integration and to find explanations for any differences
that emerge between countries.
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1 Poverty and social integration in the welfare
state: Current research and hypotheses
Social relations are considered a useful resource from the perspective both of the individual
and of society in general. The provision of support through social relations fulfils basic
individual needs for social embeddedness, sense of location and sense of belonging.
Family, friendship and organised networks provide emotional support and are a source of
various courtesies, helpful information and financial assistance (Diewald 1991). Social
disintegration, by contrast, causes anxiety and depression, leads to a decline in general
well-being and is associated with bad health and increased mortality (Wilkinson 1996,
Putnam 2000). Participation in relationship networks is considered a form of social capital
that can be activated when necessary and that under certain conditions can also be
converted into economic capital (Bourdieu 1983). From the macro-sociological point of
view, embeddedness in social networks is seen as an important indicator of solidarity,
integration and social cohesion. Embeddedness in personal relationships and networks
generates trust, creates reliable expectations and is seen as a corner stone for the
establishment of and the adherence to norms (Granovetter 1985, Coleman 1988).
Degrees of social support and embeddedness in social networks vary across Europe.
Family cohesion is especially predominant in the Mediterranean and eastern European
countries, while in the Scandinavian countries, social contacts are less family centred and
are also established via friends and organised activities (Paugam/Russell 2000, Oorschot
et al. 2006, Kääriäinen/Lehtonen 2006). “Defamilialisation” of this kind is often equated
with a lack of social capital and is seen as being associated with a universal welfare state
that renders the family superfluous as a producer of welfare and consequently reduces its
solidarity, causing social disintegration (Scheepers et al. 2002). This view is based on the
general assumption that there is a link between social policy and private readiness to
provide help. Where assistance from the state and social services are weak, so the argument
goes, then the provision of help is necessarily shifted to the private level. However, this
crowding-out hypothesis has been refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. Welfare state
support does not necessarily prevent private solidarity, rather can even promote it in some
cases (Künemund/Rein 1999, Oorschot/Arts 2005). The Scandinavian welfare states with
their universal social insurance systems are characterised by a pluralisation of social
contacts and a diversification of social networks, both of which increase the potential for
support and strengthen social capital (Saraceno/Olagnero 2006). Thus, while the focus on
the family promises a dependable source of support, especially in the Mediterranean and
post-communist countries, it also impedes the evolution of a more comprehensive support
network and goes hand in hand with a lack of trust in others and with limited extra-familial
contacts (Oorschot et al. 2006, Kääriäinen/Lehtonen 2006, Saraceno/Olagnero 2006).
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Social relations are particularly valuable in emergencies and difficult circumstances
and can be a source of support that mitigates the negative consequences of precarious
supply situations. It is well known that burdens are felt to be less stressful when emotional,
material and immaterial coping resources are available (Turner 1983, Andreß 1999). As
facilitators of access to information and contacts, social networks play an important role
in overcoming unemployment, for example (Wegener 1989, Lin 1999, Freitag 2000), and
here, too, it is weak ties and weak acquaintances that can prove to be particularly useful
(Granovetter 1973). The quality of support provided by the social networks of people with
a high level of education and a high income tends to be better than that found in the lower
strata of the population, and these networks tend to be both larger and spread over a larger
geographical area (Fischer 1982, Diewald 1986, Crow 2004). Subjectively perceived
isolation, especially, is very prevalent amongst the poor, who suspend cost-intensive
activities (Kern 2003). While cross-country empirical studies mainly show that social
embeddedness is dependent on status and confirm to varying degrees the thesis of
accumulation, in actual fact only a minority of the materially disadvantaged have no social
support (Tsakloglou/Papadopoulos 2002, Russell/Whelan 2004). The link between material
and social disadvantage is weaker in the southern than in the northern European countries.
Whether it exists at all clearly also depends on the chosen indicator. While poor people
and the unemployed more often live alone, contact with neighbours or organised activities,
for example, are not restricted (Gallie/Paugam/Jacobs 2003).
On this evidence, the state of research is therefore not clear cut, and two rival hypotheses
regarding the association between poverty and social integration emerge: The thesis of
compensation assumes that in the event of material disadvantage, solidarity will increase,
networks will become more tightly knit, and help will be availed of that could be useful
in coping with the precarious supply situation. Seen rationally, it is not withdrawal from,
but turning to other people that is plausible in situations of need. An example that supports
this view is the intensification of family support in emergency situations, for example the
delayed exit of unemployed youth from the parental home in Mediterranean countries
(Saraceno 2006).
In relation to the transformation of Eastern Europe, in particular, and the associated
rapid spread of poverty there, attention has been drawn to the widespread solidarity, the
strength of the social networks and the wealth of the relationships found in the post-
communist countries. Under the thesis of compensation, if the state does not provide an
adequate social insurance net, and if it cannot guarantee a minimum level of subsistence,
then this deficit is compensated for by increased recourse to social networks and collective
or private coping strategies (Sik/Wellman 1999, Prisching 2003).
If this assumption is true, then we should expect to see an increased readiness to provide
support through private social networks in post-communist and Mediterranean countries
that have only rudimentary social welfare benefits and a deeply solidaristic value
orientation. Thus, both cultural and religious traditions that emphasise solidarity and
family cohesion, and social security systems aimed only at a minority and covering only
basic needs, can be at the root of this compensatory response. In developed welfare states
PAGE 7
PETRA BÖHNKE
with universal social insurance systems, by contrast, poverty should have a stronger effect
on social disintegration because, according to the logic of compensation, state assistance
should displace private support.
The thesis of accumulation sees social disintegration as a consequence of, or as a
companion to poverty. The predominant view in the debate on social exclusion and the
underclass is that disadvantages accumulate. One explanation is the thesis formulated by
Bourdieu, for example, that social networks require maintenance and that maintenance
generates costs. Whereas within the family the rule may be a principle of solidarity that
is not based on direct reciprocity, most extra-familial social relations are based on a logic
of exchange and reciprocal support. When a person’s life situation is determined by
poverty, he or she lacks the means to uphold the principle of reciprocity. Family
relationships are also not always impervious to financial difficulties, which are inevitably
accompanied by conflict; in fact, male unemployment and low incomes increase the risk
of divorce (Andreß/Lohmann 2000: 73). Disadvantages such as poverty and unemployment
are often associated with shame and stigmatisation, so that those affected withdraw from
social contact or are shunned. The result is the breakdown of relationships that were linked
to a certain standard of living or life situation that no longer exists. As a consequence, the
social contacts of the poor are focused on the family, while extra-familial networks are
curtailed. Arguments of this nature seem particularly plausible when poverty is a result
of downward mobility. The notion of stigmatisation is probably more applicable to affluent
societies, where social disadvantage in the form of a low standard of living is restricted
to a minority. Where poverty is a widespread phenomenon, by contrast, it is seen as a
collective fate and it therefore causes less ground for feelings of stigmatisation (Clark
2003, Böhnke 2004). The fact that poverty is often accompanied by lack of acknowledgement,
resignedness and reduced possibilities for social participation renders the assumption that
poverty and social disintegration accumulate very likely for all countries. The strength of
the association between the two will probably vary depending on the general level of
prosperity in a country, the value given to solidarity and family cohesion, and the scope
of the social welfare system.
We know little about the context-dependent variations of the cumulative relationship
between poverty and social disintegration. There have been no studies to date on the
behaviour of the new EU member states in this respect. The following empirical analysis
illustrates characteristics of social integration in the enlarged Europe and examines
whether poverty is accompanied by social disintegration (accumulation) or whether
integration is reinforced in precarious supply situations (compensation). In the same
context, the study seeks to determine whether there is greater recourse to the family in
precarious supply situations and in which countries this is the case. Finally, reasons are
sought for the differences between countries as regards the relationship between poverty
and social integration. Here, the socio-demographic characteristics of the poor population,
the welfare-state context, the general standard of living and prevailing norms of solidarity
are chosen as explanatory mechanisms.
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2 Data
In order to respond to the above research questions, we need an up-to-date European survey
that also covers the new EU member states and that provides comparable information on
material living conditions and social integration. Although the situation regarding data
availability has improved immensely in recent years for comparative European research,
even just these few questions represent a major challenge when it comes to selecting
appropriate data, for social integration is an item that is rarely included in a comprehensive
manner in surveys that also cover the new member states, and it is even more rarely
included in combination with poverty indicators.
In the following, we draw on the European Quality of Life Survey of 2003, which
contains information on the living conditions, attitudes and perceptions of all EU citizens
(Alber et al. 2004, Kohler 2006, 2007). The relatively rough income data contained in the
EQLS can be supplemented with additional information on supply with consumer goods.
In addition, the subjective evaluation of the respondents’ social lives is also well
documented. We provide information on 25 European countries, excluding Romania and
Bulgaria, because these countries lack some aggregate indicators which become decisive
when the paper proceeds.
We use the household-weighted per capita income in order to identify individuals living
on low incomes. Unfortunately, income data are not reliable to construct a poverty
indicator, therefore, data on the availability of everyday basic goods are used to identify
people in poverty (Table 1). For determining the integration potential of individuals,
several indicators are available. These include the frequency of contacts with friends and
neighbours, the availability of support in emergencies, and the assessment and evaluation
of social and family life as well as social integration. A synoptic measure is constructed
on the basis of the single indicators by adding up several deficits in the sphere of social
relations so as to operationalise potential social disintegration. Most of these indicators
do not reflect actual receipt of support, rather the respondents’ evaluation of and degree
of confidence in their own personal networks and their expectation of being able to depend
on them should the need arise. This is, therefore, a measure of perceived social integration
and not a direct quantification of help that has been accepted or of support that would
actually be available in a real situation. The expectation of remaining isolated in situations
of need and personal dissatisfaction with one’s social environment, family life and
participation in society are sure signs of a lack of social capital, and all the more so when
they coincide.
Following Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and other classifications that modify his work
(Leibfried 1992, Siaroff 1994, Ferrera 1996, Bonoli 1997), five types of welfare regime
are distinguished that each represent their own redistribution mechanisms and relationships
between market, state and family: The southern European countries represent one cluster
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Table 1: Indicators for the operationalisation of precarious material supply and lack of social
support, EQLS 2003
* Deprivation is defined as not being able to afford twice as many basic goods as the average for the overall
population of the country. The following deprivation thresholds emerge: More than two missing items out of
nine (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden), more than three missing items (Cyprus, Malta), more than four missing
items (Czech Republic, Greece), more than five missing items (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Portugal), more than
six missing items (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).
 Indicator Operationalisation Item 
Low income Equivalent household 
income, bottom quartile 
 Material 
supply 
situation Deprivation Lack of basic goods that 
guarantee a minimum 
standard of living (the 
threshold for deprivation is 
calculated individually for 
each country on the basis 
of the average for the 
missing items)* 
For each of the following items, can your 
household afford it if you want it? Keeping 
your home adequately warm; paying for a 
week’s annual holiday away from home 
(not staying with relatives); replacing worn-
out furniture; a meal with meat, chicken or 
fish every second day if you want it; buying 
new, rather than second-hand clothes; 
having friends or family for a drink or meal 
at least once a month; car or van for private 
use; home computer; washing machine 
(No) 
    
Frequency of 
contact 
Contact with friends or 
neighbours 
On average, thinking of people living 
outside your household, how often do you 
have direct face-to-face contact with any of 
your friends and neighbours? (several times 
a year/less often) 
Support 
potential 
No support whatsoever in 
emergencies  
From whom would you get support in each 
of the following situations? If you needed 
help around the house when ill, if you 
needed advice about a serious personal or 
family matter, if you were feeling a bit 
depressed and wanted someone to talk to, 
if you needed to urgently raise 1000 (EU-
15) / 500 (NMS) to face an emergency 
(nobody) 
Dissatisfaction with 
social/family life 
Can you please tell me on a scale from 1 to 
10 how satisfied you are with your family 
life (social life), where 1 means you are very 
dissatisfied and 10 means you are satisfied? 
(0-5) 
Perception of 
social 
integration 
Perception of social 
integration 
I feel left out of society (yes) 
Social 
(dis)integra-
tion 
  
Aggregate index of eight 
individual indicators 
(Cronbach’s alpha: .613).  
 
Limited contact to friends and neighbours, 
no support (illness, advice, depression, 
money), dissatisfied with family and social 
life, feeling left out of society 
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that also comprises Malta and Cyprus. The regimes in this region are characterised by the
extreme importance they attribute to family cohesion and to inter-generational solidarity
and by an only rudimentary provision of social benefits. The post-communist countries
represent another cluster. This is suggested by their common experience of the upheaval
of transition – especially the curtailment of social benefits despite growing need as a result
of rising poverty and unemployment. While liberalisation strategies are pursued more
consistently in some post-communist countries than in others, generally welfare state
practices that follow both the Bismarckian and the Beveridgian approaches are being
implemented (Deacon 2000). Attitudes towards religion and family cohesion, especially,
also help to explain differences between countries as regards social integration and must
be appended as a supplement to the typology of welfare states.
3 Social integration in Europe
Social integration is readily available for the large majority of the population in most
European countries (Table 2). The aggregate index adds together eight indicators of
deficits in social integration. Around half of the population in almost all countries has none
of the problems with social support and integration listed here, but the situation is much
less favourable in the post-communist countries. In Latvia, especially, only around a third
of the population reports a problem-free social life. By contrast, social integration is
guaranteed for a relatively large share of the population in the northern European countries.
A total of 75 % of the Scandinavian population perceives no deficits as regards social
integration.
We speak of a heightened risk of social disintegration and a pronounced lack of social
capital when three or more of these disadvantages coincide. The share of people who are
only inadequately integrated according to this definition varies from one country to the
next and also according to the type of welfare regime. The Scandinavian countries are
particularly integrative, for only 2.5 % of their populations have severe problems with
social integration. The share is below 5 % in the liberal and continental European countries,
although the fluctuations between the individual countries are quite pronounced in these
two groups. Austria (2 %) does better, for example, than Germany and Belgium (5 %).
Although Ireland is considered a liberal welfare state just like the United Kingdom, it is
a highly solidaristic society compared to the latter. While Ireland’s population is very well
integrated and only 2 % report substantial problems, the risk of social disintegration is
much more widespread in the UK (6.5 %). The share in the Mediterranean countries varies
substantially as well: Spain and Malta (2 %) do far better than Cyprus (8 %), Greece (7
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%) and Portugal (6 %). In the post-communist countries, a substantial share of the
population – an average 11 % – has problems with social support and integration.
Especially in the Baltic countries the proportion of the disintegrated population is very
large and goes up to 19 % in Latvia.
On the basis of the distributions described here, what stands out in particular is the
marked difference between the old member states and the post-communist countries. Even
such differently organised regimes as the Scandinavian and southern European countries
Table 2: Social integration in Europe
Note: *The percentage values refer to the aggregate index for social integration, which sums
up eight deficits (see Table 1).
Source: EQLS 2003.
 No deficits 1 or 2 deficits 3 or more deficits 
 (out of eight)
*, % of the population 
Social democratic 74.4 23.2 2.5 
Finland 74.9 22.8 2.3 
Denmark 74.7 23.8 1.5 
Netherlands 74.0 22.9 3.1 
Sweden 73.9 23.2 2.9 
Continental 70.1 26.2 3.6 
Austria 79.3 18.8 1.9 
Italy 75.9 21.0 3.1 
Germany 71.3 24.6 4.1 
Luxembourg 70.4 26.9 2.6 
France 62.4 33.3 4.3 
Belgium 61.6 32.9 5.5 
Mediterranean 68.4 26.6 5.0 
Spain 77.8 19.8 2.4 
Malta 70.8 27.4 1.8 
Greece 66.4 26.9 6.7 
Cyprus 63.4 28.4 8.2 
Portugal 62.4 31.5 6.1 
Liberal 66.8 29.0 4.2 
Ireland 75.4 22.7 1.9 
UK 58.4 35.1 6.5 
Post-communist 46.0 43.0 11.1 
Slovenia 58.4 37.8 3.8 
Czech Republic 55.7 37.2 7.1 
Hungary 54.6 38.3 7.1 
Poland 49.8 42.4 7.8 
Slovakia 47.3 43.8 8.9 
Lithuania 45.0 41.9 13.2 
Estonia 41.3 45.3 13.4 
Latvia 35.2 46.3 18.5 
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produce similar outcomes as regards the social integration of their populations. A possible
explanation for this pattern could be that while solidarity is highly important in both regime
types, it is organised differently. The new member states, by contrast, and especially the
Baltic countries, have the weakest solidarity structure. Based on these overall distributions,
the crowding out hypothesis, which predicts that private support potential will be displaced
in developed welfare states and will be particularly high where the state assumes little
responsibility for redistribution, can be initially refuted. It could only lay claim to validity
if the Scandinavian populations, in particular, were highly disintegrated and the post-
communist countries showed better results. But how is the risk of social disintegration
distributed when the categories of low-income earners and deprived people are examined
separately?
4 Does poverty increase the risk of social
disintegration?
The focus in the following will be on the link between poverty and social integration in
each individual country. Do social disadvantages accumulate, so that to shortfalls in
material supplies is added a lack of social support, or can people in precarious supply
situations count on the fact that they belong to a social network and can therefore
compensate for material poverty through integration and social proximity?
Figure 1 shows the distribution of social disintegration in three different population
groups per country: high-income group, low-income group and poor individuals, where
the latter are defined as people whose standard of living falls significantly below the
average level for their country. This latter indicator is understood as a poverty indicator
that explicitly distinguishes the category of poor from that of low-income.
In all the countries of the enlarged EU, people with higher incomes are most integrated
socially. Especially in the old EU-15 countries, social disintegration is extremely rare
amongst the well off. People with low-income run a higher risk of being socially
disintegrated. Throughout the EU, they are on average four times as likely to be affected
by social disintegration as people in the upper income quartile (12 % vs. 3 %).
However, the least support is given to those whose standard of living is severely limited
and whose basic sustenance is difficult to guarantee. The share of social disintegration
among the poor ranges from 5 % in Malta to 45 % in Latvia. Material disadvantage is not
compensated for by emotional proximity and support networks and is also not accompanied
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by greater solidarity. Those who have the greatest need for social integration receive it the
least. The worse the material supply situation, the more widespread is social disintegration
– which confirms the hypothesis of accumulation quite clearly.
The variation in the degree of polarisation between rich and poor is conspicuous. It is
lowest in some Mediterranean countries (Malta, Spain) and some northern European
countries like Denmark and Finland, where although poor people are likely to enjoy less
social integration than well-off people, the difference is less pronounced than in other
countries. The same applies to Italy and Poland, for example. The share of poor who are
weakly socially integrated is very high compared to high-income earners in Lithuania,
Estonia and Latvia, where the share of socially disintegrated people is around ten times
as high amongst the poor as in the highest income group.
Figure 1: Social disintegration by population group (%)
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Note: Respondents are classified as socially disintegrated if they have agreed to at least three
of the eight indicators of inadequate social integration (see Tables 1 and 2 for the
operationalisation and distribution of the index values).
Source: EQLS 2003.
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It is difficult to carry out a classification by type of welfare state on the basis of these
distributions. The heterogeneity within the country clusters is so strong that it is practically
impossible to identify corresponding patterns of solidarity and integration. There are some
countries where only a very small share of the population is socially disintegrated and
where the differences between rich and poor appear to be minor: Malta, Denmark, Spain.
On the other hand, the population in most of the post-communist countries is not very well
socially integrated and the polarisation between rich and poor is quite high. Generally, the
difference between old and new member states is the most striking visible pattern that
arises from the given results. However, also the new member states fail to present a
homogenous picture. The poor bear a particularly high social risk in the Baltic states.
Indeed, the Baltic countries already stood out above on account of the extreme lack of social
integration in their general populations.
5 Country-specific variations in the relationship
between poverty and social integration
The mechanism of accumulation of material and social disadvantages affects every
country in the enlarged Europe. The more the supply situation is limited, the less are social
support and social networks available and satisfactory. However, differences in the
strength of this association can still be observed. The poor are not socially disintegrated
in equal measure in all countries. This section will investigate the causes of the differences
between countries as regards the strength of the cumulative interaction between poverty
and lack of social integration.
The poverty effect illustrates the strength of the association between poverty and
disintegration when other factors of influence are held constant. Figure 2 presents an
indicator obtained from linear regression analyses that shows the strength of the effect of
poverty on social disintegration when age, gender, education, household structure and
employment status are kept constant. Without these controlling indicators, the influence
of poverty on social integration would possibly be quantified inaccurately. For example,
if the poor population consists mainly of young people, as it does in Ireland, then one can
assume that the effect of poverty on social disintegration will be under-estimated because
young people can unquestionably count to a greater extent on family support than people
in middle age. It is also important to control for the effect of unemployment because there
are numerous associations between both unemployment and poverty, and unemployment
and social contact, which are not, however, the focus of this paper (Paugam/Russell 2000,
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Gallie/Paugam/Jacobs 2003). Moreover, household structure is decisive, because support
might be easier to obtain when the family context is large and people are living under the
same roof. The higher the value of the poverty effect, the greater is the explanatory power
of a significantly below-average standard of living for the lack of social integration as it
is experienced by individuals.
In addition to Poland, the southern European countries, in particular, stand out as being
characterised by a relatively minor degree of association between poverty and social
disintegration. The effect is also relatively slight in the post-communist countries. Thus,
it is in the countries whose social systems tend to be limited to basic assistance and that
value family cohesion highly that the poor are more likely to receive social support. Social
disintegration is much more strongly associated with material disadvantage in the affluent
Figure 2: The effect (regression coefficient B) of poverty on social disintegration (controlling
for employment status, age, education, household structure and gender)
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Note: The regression coefficient B indicates the effect of poverty on the degree of social
disintegration when age, employment status, education, household structure and gender are
held constant. Model: Index of social disintegration as the dependent variable, index of lack of
consumption goods as the independent variable (see Table 1).
Source: EQLS 2003.
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“old EU” countries of continental Europe and Scandinavia – Sweden, Luxembourg,
Austria, the Netherlands, UK. Even if strong poverty is a rarer phenomenon in these
countries because an above-average standard of living is guaranteed for the large majority
of citizens, solidarity with the relatively small group of deprived people is less apparent,
and there is therefore more scope for feelings of stigmatisation. It is only when poverty
is widespread that it is blamed less on the individual and interpreted more as a collective
problem of society, so that it also leads less often to social disintegration, we can suppose.
However, heterogeneity within country groups is large. The two countries characterised
as liberal welfare regimes perform quite differently: The United Kingdom stands out as
a country with a large association between poverty and inadequate social integration.
Poverty and inequality are relatively widespread in the UK and the social welfare system
is geared towards satisfying only basic needs. In Ireland, these characteristics of the liberal
welfare state are evidently offset by stronger ties of solidarity.
6 Context effects to explain the link between
poverty and social disintegration
Is it possible to explain the different strengths of the associations between poverty and
social disintegration in the European countries on the basis of context features and to
recognise systematic variations? Here, a few indicators regarding each country’s economic
situation, social benefits and welfare system, and predominant religion and prevailing
values will be used to examine macro-structural links. We use per capita gross national
product as an indicator of the general economic situation (Table 3). Both the risk-of-
poverty rate and the share of deprived individuals allow conclusions to be drawn about
stigmatisation effects. It is also conceivable that religiosity has a positive influence on
readiness to help and that Catholicism, in particular, with its strong emphasis on family
values, strengthens social integration. The indicator that can be used here is the dominant
religion in each country and the importance for her or his life that each individual attributes
to religion in general.
Cultural values and traditions of helpfulness can be ascertained via attitudes to
solidarity with the poor and to the imputation of responsibility. There are three possible
indicators in this case: One measures the diffusion of family solidarity with the poor, while
the other two provide details as to whether the prevalent opinion in a population is that
poverty is the personal responsibility of each poor individual or that poverty is a
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consequence of injustices in society. Solidarity with and willingness to help the poor will
probably be more widespread when responsibility is ascribed to a greater extent to injustice
in society.
A final block of indicators captures the features of welfare states. The amount of
spending on social protection is an indicator of the scope of social benefits. The higher the
spending, the better the poor are likely to be provided for materially. According to the
Table 3: Macro indicators of context effects
Indicator Source/Year Notes 
Economic situation    
Per capita GNP Eurostat, structural 
indicators, 2005 data 
 
Risk-of-poverty rate Eurostat 2005, 2003 data  
Share of deprived EQLS 2003  
Religiosity   
Religious denomination World Value Survey 
1999/2000 
Do you belong to a religious 
denomination? If yes, which one? 
Importance of religion World Value Survey 
1999/2000 
How important is religion in your 
life? (% very important) 
Values and attitudes   
Family responsibility Eurobarometer 52.1, 1999 / 
Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer 2002 
In your opinion, which of the 
following currently provide most of 
the help to poor or socially 
excluded people in your country? 
(% “their family” mentioned 
among the top three) 
Poverty as individual failure Eurobarometer 56.1, 2001 / 
Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer 2002 
Why in your opinion are there 
people who live in need? (% of 
“because of laziness and lack of 
willpower”) 
Poverty as societal failure Eurobarometer 56.1, 2001 / 
Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer 2002 
Why in your opinion are there 
people who live in need? (% of 
“because there is much injustice in 
our society”) 
Welfare   
Social protection 
expenditure as % of GDP 
Eurostat structural indicators 
2002 
 
Means-tested social 
protection as % of overall 
social protection 
expenditure 
Eurostat structural indicators 
2002 
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crowding-out hypothesis, we should then be able to conclude that poor people will be less
socially integrated in these circumstances because private assistance will become less
necessary. The share of means-tested benefits in relation to all social benefits indicates
the universality of social welfare. The more widespread are means tests, the more
restrictive will state support be, and accordingly the greater will be the need for private
assistance. Under this assumption, social integration should therefore be strong amongst
the poor. The categorisation of welfare state regimes, finally, differentiates countries
according to specific characteristics concerning the provision of social benefits and also
distinguishes different traditions of social equalisation. The question is whether the social
capital of the poor varies according to type of regime. For example, does the combination
in the Mediterranean countries of more restrictive social security systems that guarantee
only basic sustenance to the needy with a strong tradition of family solidarity contribute
to the fact that the poor are particularly well integrated here?
Figures 3a and 3b provide a graphic representation of the link between two context
factors and the above-illustrated poverty effect. Country-specific characteristics such as
the relative income poverty rate and the importance of religion are depicted in relation to
the influence of individually experienced poverty on social disintegration. The higher the
risk of poverty rate in a country, the weaker is the effect of poverty on social disintegration.
In other words, when many people are poor, the probability that individual poverty will
weaken social integration is lower. Stigmatisation effects enter into play in particular when
poverty only affects a minority and is interpreted as a result of personal failure. However,
this link is rather weak. There is a stronger connection between religion and the social
integration of the poor. The more important the value of religion in a country, the weaker
is the effect of poverty on social integration. Thus, the principle of solidarity with the needy
and the significance given to family cohesion which are associated with Christianity
possibly have a positive effect on the stability of social networks and the availability of
social support for the poor.
Table 4 presents a range of multi-level models that make use of both individual and
context features to explain social disintegration amongst the poor. First, model 1 only
considers the influence of socio-demographic factors. Not only unemployment strongly
determines the degree of social disintegration amongst the poor, but the probability of
losing social support also increases for pensioners and homemakers in precarious supply
situations. The level of education of the poor does not help very much to predict the
probability of social integration. This is because the group of the poor already represents
a screened selection and already constitutes a group of people who have enjoyed only a brief
education. The only exception are people who belong to the population of the poor because
they are still studying, and these are at a lower risk of social disintegration. Controlled for
retirement and illness, age, however, is a provider of social integration amongst the
deprived. Household structure is decisive: Living as a couple with or without children
reduces the risk of social disintegration in the event of material deprivation. Even single
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Figures 3a, b:  Effect of poverty on social disintegration and its relationship with context
   factors (risk-of-poverty rate, importance of religion)
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parents who are deprived can count on social support compared to those living alone. A
chronic illness, by contrast, has a decisively negative effect on the social integration of the
population of the severely poor.
When context variables are inserted into multi-level models, some interesting effects
emerge and provide insights about differences between countries that cannot be explained
on the basis of the individual characteristics of the poor population. However, only some
of the chosen indicators prove to be significant in a statistical sense. As already illustrated
in the figure above, the poor are less well socially integrated when they live in countries
in which poverty and deprivation are relatively rare. The calculations also substantiate the
significant effect of religiosity. Compared to mainly Protestant countries, countries with
a majority Catholic population are better able to guarantee social integration for poor
people. The more important is religion in the life of the people of a country, the more it
is evidently considered a matter of course to socially integrate the poor. The poor are also
more likely to be socially integrated in a country where the prevalent opinion is that it is
not laziness or a lack of willpower that places people in crisis situations, rather that a large
part of the responsibility is borne by injustice in society or more generally by the societal
circumstances. When poverty is considered a consequence of personal failure, then the
poor are left to a greater extent to look after themselves and have less access to supportive
networks. These associations indicate that the attitudes of a population to poverty and how
it should be combated have a substantial influence on the integration of the poor.
Welfare state characteristics do not influence the social integration of the poor.
Although the coefficients all point in the anticipated direction – the higher the spending
on social protection, the more likely it is that the poor will be disintegrated; the share of
means-tested benefits in relation to social benefits as a whole has a positive effect on the
integration of the poor – they remain weak and are not significant in a statistical sense. This
is due to the household structure in every country captured with the individual variables
discussed in model 1. There is a strong association between welfare state characteristics
and the composition of households throughout Europe. The share of single households is
higher in northern and continental Europe, whereas larger families and family solidarity
are more common in southern Europe and post-communist countries. Household composition
and welfare state characteristics are intertwined quite closely, so that the aggregate
indicators lose their explanatory potential.
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Table 4: Which context features explain the country-specific risk of social disintegration of
the poor? (random intercept regression analysis)
  B coeff. Significance Notes 
Gender (men) -.129 .053 
Educational (higher level)   
Lower education .066 .549 
Mean education .112 .264 
Still studying -.597 .029 
Age -.009 .002 
Labour market (employed)   
Homemaker  .373 .002 
Unemployed .542 .000 
Retired .322 .003 
Household structure (single)   
Single parent -.303 .008 
Couples with or without children -.529 .000 
Model 1 
Chronically ill .369 .000 
Individual 
level only 
     
  B coeff., semi-
standardised 
Significance Notes 
Model 2 GDP per capita .017 .796 
Model 3 Risk of poverty -.056 .043 
Model 4 Percentage of deprived -.024  .645 
Religion (Protestant)   
Catholic -.190 .000 
Mixed -.077 .018 
Model 5 
Orthodox -.070 .130 
Model 6 Importance of religion -.108 .012 
Model 7 Family responsibility .060 .190 
Model 8 Poverty as individual failure .112 .021 
Model 9 Poverty as societal failure -.071 .036 
Model 10 Amount of social expenditure .058 .296 
Model 11 Means-tested social support  -.049 .463 
Welfare regime type (social 
democratic) 
  
Continental .055 .657 
Liberal .123 .171 
Mediterranean -.041 .739 
Model 12 
Post-communist -.080  .575 
Model 13 No confidence in social benefit 
system 
.063  .200 
Individual 
level plus 
macro 
variable 
 
Notes: The sample consists of the deprived population in 23 countries (N = 4506); data were not
available from Cyprus and Malta for some of the context factors. The dependent variable is
social disintegration (index, see Table 1). Models 2 to 13 also incorporate the individual
variables from Model 1, but only show the effect of the relevant macro variable. Due to the
index construction a positive coefficient indicates a higher risk of social disintegration compared
to the reference group, whereas a negative sign indicates higher chances to be socially
integrated.
Source: EQLS 2003.
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7 Family solidarity in precarious supply situations
To conclude, this section will use an example to seek to identify the main source of social
support. Will the results indicate that the poor – even if they experience less solidarity
overall – tend to depend more on family support than the well off as suggested by the
literature? The assumption seems plausible for within the family, support is usually given
unconditionally and without any expectation of reciprocity, whereas help from friends is
possibly more likely to be withdrawn when a person’s life situation is characterised by
poverty. How, then, does the source of support vary from country to country? Finally, this
section will under which circumstances family solidarity will be strong and reliable in
cases of poverty.
Table 5 shows how many people in each country would turn in emergency situations
first to their family or first to friends, neighbours or workmates. The question asked
concerns the support potential if advice were needed about a serious personal or family
matter, if a person to talk to were needed in a moment of depression, if help around the house
were needed in the event of illness, or if a large sum of money were urgently needed in an
emergency situation. If the respondents say they would turn to their family for help in at
least three out of four of these emergency situations, then the type of support expectation
is considered to be family oriented. If they name their friends, neighbours or workmates
as the potential source of support in at least three of the four cases, then they are classed
as having an extra-familial orientation.
The results show that family solidarity is very strong in Europe. At least half of the
population in each country (only rarely is it less) can count on their family when they need
urgent help. This is most true for the Mediterranean countries and for the majority of the
post-communist, new EU member states. In the Baltic countries, but also in Finland,
Denmark and France, recourse to the family is not particularly prevalent in cases of
extreme emergency, whereas extra-familial support through friends, workmates or
neighbours is more important. In the southern European countries (Italy, Malta and
Greece) and in some post-communist countries (Poland and Hungary) extra-familial
support plays only a minor role.
A very surprising pattern emerges as regards the support that low-income earners and
deprived people would avail of in emergencies. Contrary to the assumption made above,
recourse to the family does not increase in precarious life situations. It actually decreases
in most countries – especially in welfare states of the socialdemocratic type, and also in
some of the continental-corporatist and post-communist countries. In some countries the
picture is not clear cut or the differences between the population groups are not significant.
Only in the southern European countries is the trend reversed – here, poor people have
greater recourse to family support. In Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, support from the
family increases the more precarious a person’s material situation becomes.
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Table 5: Family and extra-familial support in emergency situations (in %)
 Primarily family1 Primarily friends, workmates, 
neighbours2 
 High 
income 
Low 
income 
Poverty High 
income 
Low 
income 
Poverty 
 
Mediterranean 
 
64.3 
 
71.7 
 
71.7 
 
12.7 
 
9.4 
 
10.1 
Cyprus 77.8 72.2 58.2 3 12.4 21.8 
Portugal 67.5 72.2 73.2 16.6 13.2 10.6 
Spain 65.6 65.1 75.9 8.8 12.5 10.8 
Malta 59.3 77.8 54.2 7.7 5.6 3.3 
Greece 52.3 74.3 76.1 23.5 2.9 8 
       
Post-
communist 
60.2 54.3 53.3 15.5 15 15.2 
Hungary 72.3 68.3 69.8 8.4 10.3 9.1 
Poland 71.7 65.1 66.3 6.4 7.8 7.1 
Slovenia 66.9 67 49.1 7.9 13 16.1 
Slovakia 66 65 66 14.4 13.2 10.8 
Czech Republic 63.6 55.9 56.7 15.9 14 14.5 
Lithuania 56.3 47.3 50.8 17.2 17.3 16.7 
Estonia 43 36.1 36.3 23.7 21 22.8 
Latvia 40.6 28.1 32.6 28.3 25.5 24.6 
       
Liberal 58.5 56 47.5 18.7 19.3 32.8 
UK 59.3 55.9 43.2 16.5 16.4 31.4 
Ireland 56.6 56.1 53.5 22.4 23.4 35.3 
       
Continental 55.9 59.7 48.5 20 16.1 24.2 
Austria 63.4 58.3 50 18.3 18.7 21.1 
Luxembourg 61.6 65.8 - 9.4 13.3 - 
Germany 60.1 62.8 53.6 17.7 9.6 20.2 
Belgium 55.8 51.5 38.5 19.2 21.7 33.8 
Italy 55.2 74.7 90.6 12.3 7.3 3.1 
Netherlands 54.2 51.8 - 16.3 19.5 24.3 
France 41.6 49.7 31.4 35.1 24.3 34.8 
       
Social 
democratic 
55.2 46.1 35 15.9 20.7 25.9 
Sweden 65.5 48.1 - 9.1 16.4 18.8 
Denmark 53.5 46.9 40.7 18 23 - 
Finland 47.6 39.2 36.2 20.7 24.1 31.9 
 
Notes: (-) Less than 30 cases. 1 The respondents say they would primarily ask their families for
help in at least three out of four emergency situations (help around the house in the event of
illness, advice about a serious personal or family matter, someone to talk to in a moment of
depression, urgent need to raise a large sum of money). 2 The respondents say that their
potential source of support in at least three out of four emergency situations would be friends,
neighbours or workmates.
Source: EQLS 2003.
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Almost in a mirror image of this latter result, the recourse to support from friends,
neighbours or workmates in emergency situations decreases when a person’s financial
situation becomes precarious (Malta, Portugal, Greece and Italy). In some northern
European countries, by contrast, extra-familial support rises in importance for low-income
earners and deprived people (Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland). This also applies to
Ireland and UK, and Slovenia and Cyprus. But several countries show no significant
differences between prosperous and poor population groups as regards recourse to help
from friends.
Summing up, the generally high value attributed to family support stands out. The
Mediterranean countries – where family solidarity is traditionally highly important and
is also institutionalised in subsidiarity regulations under the social welfare system
(Saraceno 2004) – are more family centred when it comes to actual assistance and social
support. The same applies to some post-communist countries, which have also implemented
social welfare systems that incorporate family-based means tests (Deacon 2000: 154). The
Scandinavian countries with their universal social security systems rank amongst the
countries in which support from friends is valued relatively highly. Increased recourse by
poor people to assistance from within the family circle in order to overcome emergencies
is confirmed by this data only for the Mediterranean countries. In numerous European
countries, poor people count less on the family than other groups of the population. Support
from friends counters this trend only in some cases (Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom,
Slovenia and Cyprus). The lower the standard of living, the more often the respondents
report that they have nobody to ask for help.
Which factors lead people to turn first to their families for support in precarious material
circumstances? Is it individual characteristics such as age or illness, the size of the
household, family status or parenthood? Or do country-specific value orientations and
welfare-state characteristics also have an influence on the degree of focus on the family
in emergency situations? Just a few characteristics that mainly reflect opportunity
structures help to explain the family orientation of poor people irrespective of differences
between countries (Table 6). As could be expected, the type of household and type of
family, especially, prove to be decisive. Compared to people who live alone, all other
population groups turn more often to their families for support, and this is particularly true
for couples with children and people who live in multi-generation households – especially
in the southern European and post-communist countries. Generally speaking, the fact that
there are children in a family, whether they live in the family home or not, increases
individuals’ recourse to family members in emergency situations. Being of retirement age
or being older in general also increases the family orientation of the support culture in
precarious supply situations. The model also shows that it tends to be the middle and low
education strata that are more family centred. When other relevant variables are kept
constant, it emerges that the highly educated, especially, are the least family oriented when
they are poor.
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The examination of different context features in multi-level models confirms the
impression gained in Table 5. Even after controlling for individual socio-demographic
characteristics, family solidarity is still more prevalent in the Mediterranean and post-
communist countries than in the other types of welfare state (Table 6). It also emerges that
seeking support from family members is more the norm in countries where there is little
confidence in the social security system and where social benefits are at a low level in
general. The interaction between the welfare state and private assistance can be clearly
Table 6: Individual and context features that explain family support for the poor (deprived
and/or lowest income quartile) (logistic regression / random intercept logit models)
Individual level Context effects (semi-standardised) 
 B coeff. Sig.  B coeff. Sig. 
Age .006 .037 Model 1 Poverty risk .050 .530 
Female (Male) -.019 .755 Model 2 Importance of 
religion 
.132 .001 
Living together/married; 
divorced/separated  
 
-.334 
 
.012 
Model 3 No confidence in 
social welfare 
system 
.131 .019 
Widowed 
 
.496 .000 Model 4 Amount of social 
expenditure 
-.133 .008 
Single 
Single parent 
 
.289 
 
.005 
Model 5 Welfare state type 
(socialdemocratic) 
  
Couple 1.049 .000  continental .304 .217 
Couple with children 1.236 .000  liberal .110 .768 
Three generations 1.027 .000  Mediterranean  .602 .037 
    post-communist .275 .047 
Chronically ill -.040 .868     
With children .395 .000     
       
Employed       
Unemployed -.065 .458     
Retired .286 .003     
Still studying -.095 .669     
       
Mean educational level       
Lower level .075 .273     
Higher level -.270 .001     
 
Notes: The sample consists of poor people and low-income earners from 23 EU member states
(N = 7121); Cyprus and Malta are excluded because data on specific context features were not
available  here. The dependent variable is support expected from the family in three or more
out of the four emergency situations described (yes/no) (see Table 5). The context features
were examined one by one in the different models together with the individual variables.
Source: EQLS 2003.
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illustrated on the basis of these results, too: When little help is provided by the state, then
people compensate by seeking and receiving informal help. But once again religion also
plays a role. As the importance of religious values increases, so does family solidarity with
the poor, and social support is provided first and foremost by family members.
Discussion
Being poor in Europe does not only mean having little money or a standard of living that
is considerably below the average for the population. It also means having to do without
social contacts, having little recourse to emotional support, feeling no longer integrated,
and not being able to count on support to the extent that would really be necessary in a
precarious situation. In every country in the enlarged EU, people in a materially precarious
situation are affected more by social disintegration than the privileged classes of the
population. However, the degree of accumulation varies from one country to the next.
First of all, household composition is decisive. Poor people living in shared households,
with large families, or having children have better chances to be socially integrated.
Household composition varies from country to country and is closely interrelated with
welfare state characteristics and social policy design: Large family contexts are especially
common in the southern European and post-communist countries, which is strongly related
to restrictive and less generous social benefit systems. It is more frequent to provide help
and social support to poor people in these countries.
Moreover, the degree to which poverty and disintegration are related is determined by
the degree of diffusion of precarious situations within a population. The less relative
income poverty defines a society and the smaller the group of people whose standard of
living is only inadequately guaranteed at the basic level, the more difficult it is for these
people to maintain social relations and avail of supportive social contacts. Stigmatisation,
shame and individual blame are the psychological mechanisms that can plausibly explain
this effect. In countries with a large share of poor people, the polarisation between the
affluent and the needy is not so pronounced. While social networks are still more difficult
to access for those in precarious material circumstances, the difference with respect to the
privileged groups of the population is not as great because social disintegration already
affects broad classes of the population.
But other context effects also influence the interplay between poverty and social
disintegration. Social policy and inter-related general attitudes to religion, the family, and
how to combat poverty all shape the support culture and influence the willingness of the
population of a country to feel solidarity with the poor. Religiosity – and Catholicism, in
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particular, as the dominant form of religion in a country – increases the social integration
amongst the poor. The more significance is given to religious values by the population of
a country, and the more family centred the prevailing view of solidarity, the more seldom
people in precarious circumstances are left without social support. Poverty is not as
widespread in the prosperous Scandinavian and continental European countries of the old
EU, but it is associated to a greater extent with the loss of social integration. Being poor
in the richest countries of the EU, which have the highest level of social protection, also
translates to a large extent into social exclusion. This indicates the possible existence of
a crowding-out effect, at least with respect to solidarity with the poor.
These results only refer to the strength of the link between poverty and social
disintegration in a country. It is important to remember that behind this view there are also
different levels of social integration amongst the general population in each case. The
number of disintegrated persons in prosperous countries is generally much lower than in
poorer countries. And even if poor people are highly socially disintegrated in some
Scandinavian countries compared to the non-poor, they are still in most cases more
integrated than poor people in the post-communist countries, where the overall population
is both poorer and less integrated to begin with. In the Mediterranean countries, where the
high significance of religion and the family is associated with relatively rudimentary levels
of social welfare, we find willingness to provide solidarity and a culture of support to be
considered the norm in the overall population, but also amongst people in precarious
circumstances. The Baltic states represent the antithesis to the latter situation: Widespread
poverty and a very low standard of living for the overall population go hand in hand with
social disintegration for broad classes of the population.
Family support is highly important for poor people in the Mediterranean countries,
especially, but also in some of the post-communist countries. This fits in with the
institutional organisation of the social security systems in these countries, which are
substantially characterised by subsidiarity regulations and family-based means tests. The
Scandinavian countries with their universal social security systems rank amongst the
countries in which support from friends is also relatively large. This shows again the close
interplay between socio-political institutional logic and private readiness to help. It was
not possible to confirm the assumption that poverty is generally accompanied by recourse
to the family for support. Instead, poor people more often must do without support
altogether.
The results underline the urgent need to pay more attention to cumulative disadvantages,
and they prove that an exclusively monetary perspective is not sufficient in any attempt
to comprehend the question of exclusionary risks. The aspects of social relations and social
support play a major role in social exclusion as a companion to material poverty. The
interaction evidenced here between the material standard of living of the individual, her
or his social integration potential and the country-specific contexts clearly illustrates the
complexity of the conditions under which solidarity is provided and accepted. The socio-
political, cultural and economic characteristics of the country in which poverty is
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experienced decisively determine whether poor people can rely on social support or not,
and what role social support plays with respect to quality of life in general and especially
with respect to precarious supply situations.
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